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We consider the welfare effects of the emigration of workers who produce a public good (knowledge).
We distinguish between the knowledge diversion and knowledge creation effects of such emigration,
and show that the remaining residents of a country can gain from emigration, even when tastes for
knowledge goods exhibit a kind of 'home bias'. In contrast to existing models of beneficial brain drain
(BBD), our results do not require agglomeration economies, education-related externalities, remittances,
return migration, or an emigration 'lottery'. Instead, they are driven purely by the public nature of knowledge
goods, combined with differences in market size that induce greater knowledge creation by emigrants
abroad than at home. BBD is even more likely in the presence of weak sending-country intellectual
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1. Introduction.  
 
Will a “brain drain” from a small, or low-wage economy hurt or help the 
remaining residents of that economy?  While the earliest economics literature on this 
question (e.g. Berry and Soligo 1969, Bhagwati and Hamada 1974) suggested that harm 
was likely, recent contributions have identified a number of factors that could give rise to 
beneficial brain drain (BBD).  These include increased incentives to acquire education in 
the sending country (Mountford 1997), remittances (e.g. Ozden and Schiff 2006), and 
added discipline on the sending country’s tax authorities (Bucovetsky 2003).  
 
  In this paper we study another possible source of beneficial brain drain: the direct 
benefit to sending-country consumers that occurs when its brains move to an environment 
where they produce higher-quality knowledge goods.  More specifically, we model brains 
as “knowledge workers”, whose efforts improve the quality of a good that is reproducible 
at zero marginal cost (Rosen 1981).
1  Improvements in the quality of such goods benefit 
source-country consumers whether their brains live at home or abroad.  Thus, for 
example, scientists sent to a U.S. laboratory, actors sent to Hollywood, and programmers 
sent to Silicon Valley may produce products of greater value to their origin-country 
consumers than the products they would have produced at home.  Of course, both the 
amount of home bias in tastes, and the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in 
the sending and receiving countries will affect the magnitude of these gains in consumer 
welfare.  We study these effects as well.   
 
What factors might induce a sending country’s brains to produce higher-quality 
knowledge goods when employed abroad?  While we can think of several --including 
agglomeration economies and a stronger IPR environment-- in order to illustrate the 
distinct nature of the causal mechanisms studied here, our most basic model assumes 
identical production costs and full IPRs in both the sending and receiving countries.  The 
welfare gains from brain drain come instead from market size and home-bias effects: If 
the foreign market is sufficiently larger than the sending country’s, and if knowledge 
produced abroad is not too irrelevant to consumers in the sending country, the extra 
incentives to produce knowledge created by this larger market mean the (remaining 
residents of) the home country are better off allowing their knowledge workers to 
emigrate.  Later in the paper we introduce differences in intellectual property rights, 
showing that (a) weak domestic IPRs accentuate the gains from knowledge worker 
emigration, and (b) if source country IPRs are chosen endogenously, BBD becomes even 
more likely than in the base case.  Both of these results stem from the source country’s 
ability to “free ride” on its own brains after they leave.   
 
 
                                                 
1 The term “knowledge worker” was coined by Peter Drucker (1959); since then it has become a truism that 
the production of new knowledge is an essential and  growing component of a developed economy .  It is 
therefore surprising that a defining characteristic of knowledge –its publicness—has not, to our knowledge, 
yet been incorporated into formal models of international skilled worker migration.    2
2. Existing Literature 
 
As noted, the earliest economics literature on the “brain drain” (e.g. Berry and 
Soligo 1969), and indeed on international factor mobility in general (e.g. Jones, Coelho 
and Easton 1986), focused on induced changes in domestic factor prices and producer 
surplus in an undistorted “sending” economy.  Although exceptions exist (for example 
the two-good, two-factor small open economy model in which factor rewards are 
independent of factor endowments, and the case of large countries whose terms of trade 
are advantageously affected by a factor outflow), in most of these models the reduction in 
opportunities to trade with differently-endowed agents makes remaining residents worse 
off after an outflow of skilled labor.
2   
 
Since then, economists have identified a number of factors that accentuate the 
harm associated with a “brain drain”.  One such factor is a fiscal externality:  in the 
presence of publicly-subsidized education and progressive taxation, the exodus of highly 
educated workers imposes a net fiscal loss on the sending country’s remaining residents 
(Bhagwati and Hamada 1974).  Also, in an endogenous growth context, some authors 
have argued that an outflow of educated workers can inflict a very high level of harm in 
the long run by reducing a country’s growth rate (Miyagiwa 1991, Wong and Yip 1999).
3   
 
Over the same time period, however, the literature has identified a number of 
factors working in the opposite direction, generating what is sometimes referred to as 
“beneficial brain drain” (BBD).  Probably the oldest such argument is the notion that 
emigration provides a social “safety valve” for unemployed skilled workers in less 
developed countries (see for example the discussion in Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975).  
Two additional factors --by no means confined to skilled workers-- are emigrants’ cash 
remittances to the home country (e.g. Ozden and Schiff 2006), and the return migration 
of “brains” who have acquired new skills abroad (possibly at foreign taxpayers’ 
expense).
4  Less obviously, Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) have argued 
that the possibility of emigrating and earning a higher wage can raise incentives to 
acquire education in less-developed sending countries.  If this effect is strong enough 
relative to the actual outflow of educated workers, the “sending” country’s stock of 
skilled workers can of course rise.  Extending this “emigration lottery” reasoning to an 
endogenous growth framework, Mountford (1997) has shown that the temporary 
possibility of skilled-worker emigration can “jump-start” an economy out of a poverty 
trap.   
 
                                                 
2 Despite its age, the argument still figures prominently in contemporary policy discussions about 
international labor mobility (e.g. Borjas 1995).  Of course, nothing in the argument is specific to skilled 
labor:  it pertains to any non-infinitesimal factor outflow that does not mirror the nation’s factor 
endowment mix exactly.   
3 Introducing a skilled worker outflow into more traditional growth models (where growth occurs purely 
via either human or physical capital accumulation) has less dramatic negative long run effects (see, e.g. 
Rodriguez 1975).  
4 According to DeVoretz (2005), it is precisely this prospect of return migration that led China to relax its 
exit requirements in the early 1990s.   3
  Most recently, Bucovetsky (2003) and Haupt and Janeba (2004) have considered 
the discipline that skilled emigration could impose on tax authorities in skilled-worker 
“sending” countries:  human capital, once acquired, is sunk and therefore vulnerable to 
over-taxation by governments with limited commitment power.  By constraining 
governments’ abilities to tax human capital, the possibility of brain drain can induce 
those governments to act in their country’s own long run interests, thus raising the long 
term level of human capital investment and per-capita income.   
 
  In addition to the literatures on brain drain and international factor mobility, the 
current paper also relates to recent work on intellectual property rights, including 
Grossman and Lai (2004).  These authors examine countries with different market sizes, 
and show that equalizing IPRs across countries may hurt a human-capital poor country; 
further such equalization is not necessary to provide optimal aggregate incentives for 
innovation.  Helpman (1993) examines IPRs in a model of endogenous, ongoing 
innovation, and shows that weakening IPRs in a single country can benefit both that 
country and its trade partner; the welfare gain arises when weakening IPRs in high-wage 
North shifts production to low-wage South.  Neither of these models, however, examine 
the effects of international labor migration.   
 
 
3. The Model  
 
We focus on a single knowledge worker, or “artist”. The artist produces a 
prototype knowledge good; the prototype can be replicated costlessly.   The prototype 
might be, for example, a musical recording, an insight into the laws of physics, or a 
malaria vaccine. 
 
Market willingness to pay for reproductions depends on both the quality, ρ, and 
relevance, t, of the knowledge good, each to be discussed below.  We assume individual 
inverse demand for a reproduction is given by tρp(q) where p(q) is a decreasing function 
of quantity consumed per capita, q.  We can interpret p(q) as base inverse demand, i.e. as 
marginal willingness to pay for a unit of a knowledge good with 100% relevance and 






) ( − ≡ ε as the elasticity of base demand.  An interior solution 
to the profit maximization problem requires ε be decreasing in q, which we assume 
throughout the remainder of the paper.   
 
The variable ρ captures the intrinsic quality of a good, for example, if the good is 
a treatment for influenza, ρ may index the speed with which the treatment reduces flu 
symptoms. We draw a distinction between quality and applicability, or relevance: ever 
since Armington (1969), several economists (e.g. Trefler 1995) have argued that 
consumers may prefer locally produced goods to otherwise-identical imports.
5  In the 
current paper we operationalize home bias via an iceberg “translation” cost 1-τ; we can 
                                                 
5 Empirical studies tend to find strong evidence of home bias in consumption.  For example, Whalley and 
Xin (2006) find home bias can account for over 90% of the measured border effect in US-Canada trade.   4
think of τ as the fraction of a knowledge good’s value that survives translation to a 
foreign market.  Recalling terminology introduced above, let t
ij measure the relevance to 
consumers in market i of a knowledge good developed in market j; then with iceberg 
translation costs t
ij = 1 for i=j and t
ij = τ ∈ [0,1]  for i≠j; accordingly, we can think of τρ 
as the net premium for imported, or translated, goods.  We treat τ as a parameter outside 
the artist’s and government’s control, however we acknowledge that τ will vary with the 
type of knowledge good considered: for instrumental music τ may be near unity; the τ 
associated with comedy is often remarked to be close to zero.
6   
 
  If emigration is legal, the artist faces a two-stage problem.  First she must decide 
where to live and work, and second she must decide what quality prototype to produce 
and how to price it to each market. As usual, we begin with the second stage.   
 
3. 1 Stage Two:  Profit Maximization 
 
We simplify the world into two countries: Source (S) and Recipient (R).  Let N
i be 
the number of consumers in country i∈{S,R}.  Define π
i = maxq p
i(q)q as the artist’s 
maximized per capita base profits from market i, and q
i = argmaxq p
i(q)q as her optimal 
per capita deliveries to this market.
7  Note that our inverse demand functions are indexed 
by country (i); this allows per-capita income differences to enter our model with higher 
income assumed to shift the inverse demand curve upwards.  In this section we assume 
that both Source and Recipient provide full legal protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs).  Thus the artist is an uncontested monopolist in both markets, and will choose q
i 
such that ε=1 in each market. Using these definitions, we can rewrite the artist’s total 
profits from market i when residing in country j as N
it
ijρπ
i.  Further, the artist can treat π
S 
and π
R as parameters when solving her investment and location problems.  
 
Improving the quality of the prototype comes at a price.  The knowledge worker 
may hire complementary inputs (a scientist outfitting a better lab), acquire additional 
human capital (voice lessons for an opera singer, a post doc for a biologist), or simply put 
in more effort (work longer hours).  We will refer to any such actions as investments. Let 
c(ρ) measure the total cost of producing a prototype of quality ρ.  We assume the 
marginal cost of improving prototype quality is positive and increasing, i.e. c'(ρ) and 
c''(ρ) are both positive; define  
 
ψ ≡ c''ρ/c' 
 
as the elasticity of the marginal investment cost.  In general, ψ is a function of ρ, although 
on occasion we will adopt the following assumption: 
 
                                                 
6 Importantly, the home bias in our paper refers to the artist’s current location, not his/her country of birth; 
thus we assume that, for example, Indian consumers treat goods produced by Indian expatriates in the 
United States similarly to goods produced by other Americans.  In part, this is based on a very prevalent 
notion in the business literature that close contact (in our case living in the same country and culture) with 
consumers is essential to producing innovations that customers like (see for example Ulwick 2002).  
7 Because ε is decreasing in q, base profits p
i(q)q are locally concave at q
i and q
i is unique.   5
A1: c is iso-elastic in ρ, i.e. ψ is a constant. 
 














R, which measures the size 
of the artist’s effective global base market when residing in country j.  Thus we can 
rewrite the artist’s investment problem when residing in country j as 
 
maxρ  ρM 
j- c(ρ). 
 
A convex cost function (i.e d
2c/dρ
2  > 0) ensures the second order conditions for an 
interior maximum, while the first order condition  
 
M
j = c’(ρ)  
 
implicitly defines ρ(M
j) as the price premium corresponding to the artist’s optimal 
investment when residing in country j.   Because higher values of ρ reflect higher quality 
knowledge goods, we can interpret an increase in ρ as knowledge creation; differentiating 
the first order condition we see dρ(M)/dM = 1/c'' > 0.  Hence, if an action by the artist or 
a government increases the size of the artist’s effective market, that action will in turn 
have a knowledge creation effect.  
 
3.2 Stage One: Emigration 
 
We assume zero relocation costs. Since the artist earns more when M is larger, 
she will move to wherever her residency confers the largest global base market.  If the 





R.  If instead she 





R.  For τ<1, whether M
S<M
R 
depends only on relative populations and base profits.  Assuming the artist stays home 
when indifferent, we obtain the following lemma and proposition. 
 







If both countries have the same individual inverse demand curves (for example because 
their per capita income levels and tastes are the same), Lemma 1 implies that the artist 
optimally locates herself in the country with the largest population for any non-zero level 
of translation costs.  Of course, the artist might optimally choose a country with smaller 
population if its consumers were sufficiently richer than the other country.   
 
Proposition 1: Voluntary emigration induces knowledge creation. 
 
Proof:  





which is equivalent to the condition M
R > M
S for τ<1.  Since dρ/dM > 0 
then ρ(M
R) > ρ(M
S) and so emigration leads to higher quality knowledge 






S then Recipient offers a larger effective market than Source.  Since the 
artist can take better advantage of that market by relocating to Recipient, she emigrates.  
Once immersed in the Recipient market, the artist responds to the increased returns on 
her investment, producing a higher quality prototype. 
 
 
4. Beneficial Brain Drain 
 
We now turn our attention to conditions under which brain drain is beneficial to 
the parties involved.  In order to minimize the number of cases that must be described, we 
restrict our attention in the remainder of the paper to cases in which the artist will 






    Clearly consumers in Recipient and the artist all benefit from voluntary 
emigration if, as assumed so far, both Source and Recipient offer full legal IPR 
protection.  A simple revealed preference argument confirms that the artist benefits.  To 
see that consumers in Recipient gain, we look at their consumer surplus, denoted CS.  








gives consumer surplus in country i when the artist resides in country j, where 
 
i i q i q q p dq q p
i
) ( ) (
0 − = Φ ∫  
 
is “base” consumer surplus per capita, i.e. consumer surplus associated with quality-
unadjusted goods, when q
i units are sold per capita in country i.  Notably, Φ
i is 
independent of ρ. 
 







R. With migration, CS




R.  Thus migration benefits Recipient consumers if and only if 
ρ(M
R) > τρ(M
S), which is assured by τ ≤ 1 and Proposition 1. ■ 
 
Recipient consumers gain from the Artist’s immigration on two counts.  Firstly, they 
benefit from the knowledge creation stemming from their large native market.  Secondly, 
migration induces knowledge diversion. To the extent that the flavor and applicability of 
a knowledge worker’s prototype is influenced by her environment, some of the value of 
an artist’s output is “lost in translation” to overseas consumers. When the artist resides in 
Source, Recipient’s consumers suffer 1-τ in translation losses.  Alternately, we can think 
of 1-τ as the local component of knowledge goods; this local component accrues only to 
the artist’s fellow residents.  Emigration transfers this local component of the artist’s 
knowledge good from Source’s consumers to Recipient’s.  This knowledge diversion is   7
to Recipient’s unambiguous benefit. However it comes at Source’s expense, and must be 
weighed against the rate of knowledge creation. 
  
Proposition 3: Source’s consumers are made better off from voluntary migration if and 










> 1-τ.         (1) 
Proof:  
Following the proof of Proposition 2, emigration raises Source’s consumer 
surplus if and only if ρ(M
R)τ>ρ(M
S).  Multiplying each side by -1, adding 
ρ(M
R) and then converting to ratios gives the equivalent condition (1).■ 
 
Proposition 3 formalizes the condition that the knowledge creation effect of emigration 
must dominate the knowledge diversion effect in order for brain drain to benefit Source’s 
consumers.  However, because (1) is written in terms of endogenous values, it does not 
tell us under which parameter conditions BBD occurs. 
 
Proposition 4: Define  ≡
_
ψ S S R R
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,       (2) 
then there exists a non-empty interval ( ,1) of translation rates under which voluntary 




τ ∈(0,1).  
(b) If A1 holds and (2) is satisfied then there exists a value   that divides the interval 
















































(c) If A1 holds and (2) is violated then Brain Drain is harmful to Source’s consumers for 
any τ∈[0,1).  
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Corollary 1: Under A1, when condition (2) holds, there exists a non-empty interval ( ,1) 




   8
Part (a) of Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition for BBD; if in addition 
investment costs are iso-elastic, i.e. condition A1 holds, then parts (b) and (c) provide 




R) and diversion, 1-τ, when condition (2) holds. Clearly, the 
possibility of BBD depends on the curvature of the cost function and the size of the 
translation cost. Because the right hand term in condition (2) can be no larger than unity, 
a necessary condition for BBD is that marginal costs be inelastic in ρ, i.e. ψ < 1.  This is 
not inconsistent with investment costs being convex in quality: if c is iso-elastic, for 
example, convexity requires only that ψ be positive.  Rather, the constraint that ψ < 1 
simply requires that investment costs not rise too quickly with quality. 
 








= rate of knowledge creation






Figure 1:  knowledge creation versus knowledge diversion
 
 
Another critical parameter is τ. If translation losses are complete, i.e. τ=0, then 
knowledge creation is irrelevant to Source’s consumers since they won’t be able to 
understand, or make use of, any of it.  Conversely, if τ=1 then any additional knowledge 
created will be perfectly useful to Source’s consumers; however, because M
S and M
R 
would be identical, emigration would leave ρ unchanged. But, if τ has an intermediate 
value, then voluntary emigration prompts investment and some of that quality 
improvement survives translation.  If τ is not too small, the net value of the artist’s 
product will rise for Source’s consumers, rendering brain drain beneficial.  Figure 1 
nicely illustrates how both differences in effective market size and home bias (i.e. 
“translation costs”) are required for BBD:  if there is no home bias, knowledge workers 
can serve the entire world equally well from wherever they live; thus there is no 
efficiency gain from sending them into a large consumer market such as the U.S.    
  
The final determinant of whether (2) holds, and hence whether BBD is possible, is 
Source’s relative size.   9
 
Proposition 5.   Under A1, the range of cost-elasticities and translation costs  under 
which Brain Drain is beneficial to Source’s consumers are each larger the smaller is 
Source’s aggregate base profits N
Sπ
S relative to Recipients, N
Rπ



















Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 5 simply states that brain drain is more likely to benefit the Source country 
when aggregate base profits in Source are small.  Some of the factors determining 
aggregate base profits, e.g. the size of the native population as well as their income level -
--the latter being a determinant of base demand p(q))-- are outside the control of 
policymakers, at least in the short run.  However, since the goods in question are 
knowledge goods, goods which can be reproduced at essentially zero cost, then π
S may 
depend critically on de jure and de facto rules governing intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), which are the subject of the next section. 
 
 
5. Brain Drain and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
This section poses two questions.  First, we ask how the previous section’s 
conclusions, derived for the case of full intellectual property rights in both countries, 
change when IPRs are fixed at some other exogenous level that can differ across 
countries.  This generates a set of comparative statics for the effects of IPRs on the gains 
(or losses) from knowledge worker emigration.  Second, we endogenize IPR policy by 
characterizing a (potential) sending country’s best combination of emigration and IPR 
policies.  The goal of this exercise is to see whether (or when) BBD is still optimal when 
the source country has access to a broader array of policy tools.
8  
 
The strength of a country’s IPRs can be measured along two dimensions: the 
breadth of its fair use rules, and the zeal with which it enforces its rules.  We consider 
only the case in which fair use rules are very tight, and so the consumer must purchase 
one copy of the artist’s prototype for each application (e.g. one copy of an operating 
system for the user’s desktop, another copy for his laptop), but where enforcement is 
imperfect. In particular, a competitive fringe sells pirated reproductions of the artist’s 
prototype at marginal cost.  Assume constant returns to scale in producing pirated goods, 
and denote their marginal cost by d. Assuming pirates have access to the same 
reproduction techniques as the artist, the materials portion of d is zero.  Thus d reflects 
only the expected costs of getting caught distributing copyrighted materials.  In 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, in conducting this exercise we continue to characterize Source’s emigration policy as a 
simple choice between “closing its exits”, i.e. prohibiting emigration, or not (rather than, for example, an 




R, brain drain is inevitable unless Source’s exit-
doors are closed; thus open-exit policy is synonymous with “Brain Drain” in our discussion.     
   10
particular, we assume d equals the probability of detection multiplied by the (non-
monetary) penalty for piracy.  For parsimony, we assume the penalty is proportional to 
the price premium, tρ, for the translated good. This means the marginal cost in country i 





ijρ         (3) 
 
where β
i is increasing in the strength of i’s IPR enforcement.  This β
i proxies the strength 
of de facto IPRs, and equals the base price of pirated goods.  
 
When facing a competitive fringe with marginal cost d, the artist becomes a contested 
monopolist.  We assume that all demand goes to the artist if legal and pirated goods are 
offered at the same price. Decomposing d
ij as indicated in (3), the contested monopolist’s 




ij ρ p(q) q,  s.t. p(q) ≤ β
i.  
 
As is usual with constrained monopoly, we can write the artist’s maximized per capita 
































where β* is the base price the artist would set absent any competition and p
-1(·) is the 
inverse of function p(·).   
 
Lemma 2 π(β) is increasing in β for β <β*.  
Proof:  
For β<β*, dπ(β)/dβ=p
-1(β)[1-ε].  Since ε is decreasing in q and ε is unity 
at the uncontested monopoly output p
-1(β*), then, for any β<β*, ε<1 and 
thus dπ(β)/dβ>0.■ 
 
For β <β*, it follows that the artist’s total profits from market i when residing in country j  
can now be written as: N
i t
ij ρ π
i(β), where dπ(β)/dβ>0; the only change from the case of 
full IPRs is that π
i  is now a function of β (but, importantly, not of ρ).  In the full-IPR 
case, we were able to treat these total profits as exogenous conditional on N
i, 
 t
ij and ρ.  
Now, profits are exogenous conditional on N
i, 
 t
ij and ρ and β
i .   
  












R.   
 
Given Lemma 1, Assumption A2 ensures that Source is too small to be attractive to the 
artist even if Source fully protects intellectual property.    11
 
Assumption A2 is not innocuous.  It hinders our analysis from applying to large 
Source countries whose ample population and income levels would allow Source a 
second means of preventing emigration: offering sufficiently strong local IPRs.  As 
before, we rule out such possibilities for the sake of brevity.  We note, though, that it is 
possible to show that a large country may prefer to forego strong IPRs---suffering Brain 
Drain as a result---if translation costs are small relative to the deadweight loss from 
market power.   
 
We next look at the properties of consumer surplus when pirates are at play.  
Define CS
Sj(β) as Source’s consumer surplus when Source IPR’s are β and the artist 







S),            (4) 
 
where      
Φ
S(β







) ( ) (




Comparing this to the equivalent expression in the full-IPR case, the only change is that 
source-country per-capita base surplus, Φ
S, now depends on the IPR parameter, β (but 
again, not on ρ).  It is easy to show that dΦ
S/d(β) = - p
-1(β ) < 0; i.e. holding product 
quality fixed, stricter IPRs (and therefore higher prices) make consumers worse off.   
 
  We are now in a position to consider the effects of brain drain on source 
consumer surplus at any exogenous level of IPR in both the sending (S) and receiving (R) 
countries, and to ask how Source’s optimal emigration policies depend on IPR in the two 





emigration, it is N
Sρ(M
R ) τ Φ
 S (β




R ), or if condition (1) holds.  Importantly, while strict source 
country IPRs (higher β
S) directly reduce source consumer surplus, their direct effect on 
source consumer surplus is the same whether emigration occurs or not.  Thus the 
condition for Source to gain from brain drain is the same as in the presence of full IPRs 
(equation 1); the only difference is the need to account carefully for the effects of IPRs on 
product quality via the effective market sizes, M
S and M
R.  To do this, note that when 




















R ),   
 
which are identical to the previous conditions with the exception that per-capita base 
profits now depend on IPR policies in both the sending and receiving countries, β
S and 
β
R.  It follows that the effects of an exogenous increase in Source IPRs (a rise in β
S) on   12
optimal emigration policy are identical in direction to the effects of an increase in source-
country population, N
S,  or for that matter to an exogenous increase in source-country 
base profits (π
S) (caused for example by an increase in source country income).  The 
proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 both go through exactly as before, with a rise in β
S (or a 
fall in β
R) equivalent to a rise in α. Thus, in the sense formalized in Proposition 5, an 
exogenous rise in IPR protection in Source (Recipient) makes BBD less (more) likely.   
 
  The intuition behind these results is fairly straightforward.  As we have shown, 
for any fixed source IPR policy (and therefore a fixed base price for the knowledge 
good), the only effect of brain drain on Source consumers is via its effects on the quality 
and appropriateness of the knowledge good.  The larger the differential in IPR protection 
between the recipient and source country, the larger the increment to quality will be when 
Source’s brains move abroad, making beneficial brain drain more likely.  In sum, if 
Source has low IPR protection for reasons that lie outside our model (for example, its 
legal system and enforcement technology may simply not be capable of a high level of 
enforcement), Source’s interests are more likely to involve sending its knowledge 
workers abroad and consuming better (if culturally less appropriate) entertainment, 
science and technology as a result.  If Recipient (again for reasons outside our model, 
such as a politically powerful knowledge industry) has very strong IPR protections, again 
it may behoove Source to “let its knowledge workers go”.   
 
  Our final exercise in this paper involves endogenizing IPR policy.  The goal in 
doing so is not so much to provide a realistic model of IPR policy (this choice has been 
studied in detail by Grossman and Lai, 2004, among others), but to ask how our main 
results regarding the optimality of beneficial brain drain in the limiting case where we 
allow countries to optimally adapt their IPR policies to their emigration policy regime.  
We do so in full recognition that not all important factors affecting optimal IPR policy 
are included in our model.   
 
We begin by differentiating our expression for source-country consumer surplus 
(4) with respect to β (while appropriately allowing for the endogeneity of product quality, 































   
 
or, if β > 0, equivalently:  
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j is country i’s contribution to the artist’s effective global market when 
the artist lives in country j.     13
 
Lemma 3. Under A1, CS
Sj is strictly (locally) concave in β at any extremum.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Referring to (6), whether strict IPRs raise or lower Source’s consumer surplus depends on 


















.  The first term in ∆ reflects the investment 
effects of raising β: stronger Source IPRs translate to higher base profits for the artist, 
prompting greater investment; the second term in ∆ measures the loss in base consumer 
surplus arising from consumers having to pay higher prices per (base) unit.  We can think 
of these as the investment and consumption effects of strong IPRs.  Define β
O and β
C as 
Source’s optimal choice of β when its doors are open and closed, respectively.  
 
Proposition 6: Under A1 and A2,  
(a) If Source offers any IPR protection at all, it offers weaker policy when its exits are 
open than closed.  Specifically, β
O<β
C if and only if  
 
] [







>1;      (7) 
 
if (7) fails then β
O=β
C=0. 




Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Intuitively, Source’s optimal IPR policy balances the investment and consumption 
effects described above.  Since the investment effects are dissipated as β approaches β*, 
Source will always offer less than full IPRs when the artist’s residency is given. 
Moreover, when the Artist lives abroad rather than in Source, the investment incentives 
associated with high π
S are diluted by translation losses.  Thus the investment effect of 
high β is weaker when Source’s exits are open, rendering strong IPRs less attractive to 
Source. 
 
We are now in a position to revisit our earlier claims concerning when/whether 
Brain Drain might benefit the Source country.   In particular, Proposition 4 provided a 
sufficient condition for Source to gain from BD under the condition that Source IPR 
policy was full.  However, as Proposition 6 highlights, Source has an incentive to set 
weaker IPR policy when suffering from Brain Drain.  The following extends Proposition 
4 to allow for endogenous IPRs.. 
   14
Proposition 7. Suppose Source’s IPRs are set optimally given exit policy, i.e. β=β
O when 
Source’s exits are open and β=β
C when Source’s exits are closed.  Define  (β) as the 
non-unity value of τ at which 
_
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is a sufficient condition for Source to prefer an open-exit policy in lieu of closed-exits for 
some non-empty range (τ
1,1) of translation costs; 






Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Part (a) of Proposition 7 offers a sufficient condition for brain drain to benefit 
Source even when Source adjusts its IPRs to complement its emigration policy.  The 
underlying logic is the same as for Proposition 4: emigration transfers the local 
component of knowledge goods away from Source’s consumers---what we have coined 
knowledge diversion; in exchange, the large market that attracts mobile knowledge 
workers in the first place prompts them to produce higher quality goods, inducing 
knowledge creation.  This basic principle is unchanged by endogenous IPRs.  However, 
as Part (b) of Proposition 7 indicates, the range of translation costs at which brain drain is 
beneficial is larger when IPRs are endogenous rather than fixed (and full). This is 
because endogenous IPRs open up a second channel through which Source can benefit 
from the artist’s emigration to a large overseas market.  Simply, Source can manipulate 
domestic IPRs to raise consumers’ share of the benefits from knowledge creation: by 
lowering β, i.e. by weakening domestic IPRs, Source can raise Φ, allowing Source’s 
consumers to reap a greater share of the benefits from any increase in ρ.
9  A case in point 
might be Canada’s policies on drug pricing and medical researcher emigration:  Canada’s 
policies of keeping the prices of drugs (including those invented in the U.S.) well below 
U.S. levels actually accentuates the gains to Canadian consumers from allowing medical 
researchers to emigrate to the U.S.   
 
Finally, we revisit our earlier suggestion that BBD is more likely when Source has 
a small native population.  This claim may seem innocuous given Proposition 5, but if π
S 
is endogenous then a proper proof should account for any influence that N
S has over 
Source’s IPR policy. 
 




Proof: See Appendix. 
                                                 
9 Of course, raising Φ by lowering β will in turn reduce π, and so the knowledge creation effect will be 
smaller---but still positive ---when Source IPRs are endogenous.   
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Proposition 8 indicates that bigger economies have incentives to set stricter IPRs. 
The intuition is straightforward: the large base profits associated with strict Source IPRs 
are more meaningful (to the Artist) when Source’s native market constitutes a larger 
share of the artist’s global market.  Conversely, when Source is small its IPRs have a 
weaker investment effect, rendering strict IPRs less attractive to Source. Thus we can 
confirm that Source’s effective market size N
Sπ
S is increasing in N
S, both directly and 
indirectly via π
S(β), and so by Proposition 5 we can conclude that countries with small 





In the late twentieth century, the worldwide pattern of information goods 
production and IPR protection had three distinct features.  First, knowledge goods 
production was highly concentrated in a single country with a large domestic market (in 
most cases the United States).
10  Second, a significant share of these goods was produced 
by immigrants to that country.
11  Third, intellectual property rights protection was 
strongest in the producing country and weaker in other countries, including the source 
countries from which migrating knowledge workers were drawn.   While the exodus of 
talented “brains” to larger, richer economies is sometimes bemoaned in sending 
countries, this paper shows that, under quite general conditions, all the above features 
could be in the interests of both the migrating knowledge workers and the remaining 
residents of the nations that send them.   Remaining residents benefit because “their” 
brains produce “better” knowledge (such as more effective medicines, more entertaining 
movies, or more effective software) abroad than if they had remained at home.   
 
Some noteworthy features of our model include the following.  First, beneficial 
brain drain “BBD” is possible even when (a) the sending country places no welfare 
weight on the utility of its expatriates, (b) knowledge/cultural goods are less culturally 
relevant to the source market when produced abroad, that is, when demands exhibit home 
bias, or “losses in translation”, and (c) both sending and receiving countries fully protect 
knowledge workers’ intellectual property rights in a national treatment framework.   
                                                 
10 Using purchasing power parity measures of R&D activity, Dougherty et al (2003) find that expenditures 
in the US exceeded the combined expenditures of the next four leading research nations, Germany, Japan, 
France and UK.  In 2000, 34.3% of Triadic Patent Families (defined by the OECD as “patents taken out at 
the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the US Patent & Trademark 
Office ( USPTO) that share one or more priorities”) were taken out by American residents.  The 
comparable proportions for residents of Japan and the EU are 26.9 and 31.4 (Source: OECD, Patent 
Database, September 2004.)  The international predominance of the United States as a source of 
commercial popular culture is well known.  
11 In addition to entertainers, this of course includes scientists and engineers working in U.S. firms and 
universities.  Nearly one in five scientists and engineers in the United States is an immigrant; 51 percent of 
US doctorates in engineering are currently awarded to foreigners (Zakaria 2005).     16
Second, while we acknowledge that agglomeration economies may be important in 
explaining the location of many industries (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991) and a 
potential source of beneficial emigration, such external economies are not present in our 
model.  Instead, the international specialization (via the migration of producers to a single 
country) derives simply from differences in domestic market size and home bias in tastes.  
Of course, in an expanded model there could be other important factors that induce 
expatriate “brains” to produce more and better knowledge when located in a country like 
the United States than at home; not least among these are the ability to cooperate with 
other factors of production (including critical masses of highly skilled workers) that the 
U.S. has already produced (or imported).  Thus a natural extension of the current model 
would be to a dynamic context in which critical masses, or “clusters” of knowledge 
workers are created endogenously; importantly however these dynamics are not essential 
to the basic argument here.   
 
  Third, source countries’ gains from brain drain depend on intellectual property 
rights in both the sending and receiving countries-- rising with weaker sending country 
and with stronger receiving country IPR protection.  The likelihood that brain drain 
benefits the source country also increases when we expand its menu of policy tools to 
include an optimal choice of IPRs.  Thus it may be in the interests of a small, or poor 
country to simultaneously specialize out of knowledge goods production (even actively 
sending its talented knowledge workers abroad) and keep the price of knowledge goods 
low by setting weak IPRs.  
 
  Finally, the level of home bias in consumers’ tastes has interesting effects in our 
model.  If we think of our parameter τ (the fraction of a knowledge good’s value that 
survives export to another country) as rising over time due to declines in international 
transportation and communications costs, then our model predicts that source countries’ 
benefits from brain drain will be minimal when international communication is poor, and 
will then rise as the ability of knowledge workers in one country to serve consumers in 
another rises.  It is only in the limiting case of zero ‘home bias’ (τ  = 1) --where 
knowledge workers can serve the world’s consumers equally well from any location-- 
where better international communication eliminates the gains to consumers in a small or 
poor country from sending their brains abroad.   
 
  Our results may have interesting implications for policies affecting “brain drain” 
in small, or poor countries that have not, to our knowledge, been noted before.  For 
example, skilled-emigrant-sending countries may want to refine their policies (or at least 
their discussion of the issue) by distinguishing emigrants according to the “publicness” of 
the goods they produce.  Thus, for example, the emigration of a physician who spends all 
of her time treating patients (a private good) may be more likely to hurt the remaining 
residents of her country than the emigration of a physician primarily engaged in research 
on new treatments and medicines (the sort of knowledge good modelled in this paper).    
 
  We close by asking why the existing literature on the “brain drain” has apparently 
not noticed the simple consumption effect of emigration on remaining residents that sits 
at the core of the current paper.  We conjecture that this is because the literature has not,   17
to date, considered the production of “knowledge goods” that can be reproduced at zero 
marginal cost.  Instead, all existing models of international factor mobility of which we 
are aware treat skilled workers simply as an input to the production of private goods.  To 
the extent that knowledge produced by skilled workers has “public” qualities, this has 
been modelled as a production externality where the presence of more skilled workers 
makes other workers in the country where they live more efficient at producing private 
goods (e.g. Mountford 1997).
12 The consumption benefits to sending countries of 
knowledge produced by expatriates have thus tended to be ignored; we hope the present 
model encourages more exploration of this important aspect of international skilled 
worker flows.   
 
                                                 
12 In principle, one could of course construct a model in which private goods imported from the U.S. 
become cheaper to Indian consumers as a result of Indian “brains” migrating to the U.S., but to our 
knowledge no such model has been developed.     18
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
 
Part (a).  Rearranging Proposition 3 indicates voluntary brain drain is beneficial to 






























 is positive and less than unity, while Γ(t=1)=1; 
therefore, if dΓ/dτ>1 when τ=1, then the continuity of Γ in τ ensures there exists a non-




τ ∈(0,1).  Differentiating Γ with respect 
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which is greater than unity if and only if (2) holds.  
 








































.  Twice differentiating Γ 
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which is positive for all τ∈[0,1] if and only if ψ<
_
ψ .  Hence whenever (2) holds, Γ is 
globally convex in τ and thus 
_
τ ∈(0,1) divides the unit interval into regions where brain 
drain is and is not beneficial to Source’s consumers. 
 


















.       
If ψ>
_
ψ  then dΓ/dτ is less than unity whenever τ is such that Γ=τ.  Hence the 1-Γ curve 





= τ τ d
d
 then Γ≤τ is ruled out whenever ψ>
_
ψ  and τ<1. Finally, suppose ψ=
_
ψ ; then Γ 
is strictly convex in τ for τ<1.  Moreover, since Γ>0 for α>0 when τ=0, while Γ and dΓ/dτ 
are both unity when τ=1, then Γ≤τ is ruled out whenever ψ=
_




Proof of Proposition 5: 
 









, which is 
decreasing in α. Hence the range of cost elasticities (0, 
_
ψ ) for which brain drain is 
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 for τ<1, which implies d /dα>0; thus the smaller is α, the 







Proof of Lemma 3: 
 

















































Because ε is decreasing in q, ε is non-decreasing in β; since higher prices translate to 
lower consumer surplus, dΦ/dβ<0; since profits are increasing in β, dM











at any extremum of CS
Sj.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
 
We prove Part (b) first. Since the artist’s marginal costs of reproduction are zero, if her 







<0 whenever ε=1, thus Source never offers full intellectual property 
protection if the artist’s residency is fixed. Finally, when A2 holds, Source’s exit-policy 
fully determines the artist’s residency; thus Source can treat the artist’s residency as 
invariant to β within a given exit-policy regime.   22






≤ 0 for j∈{S,R} and so Source 
sets β
k=0 for k∈{O, C}.  If instead (7) holds then β
C>0; by part (b), β
C<β
*.  Hence β
C 
takes an interior value; from equation (6), β
C solves ∆(β














=0.  By 
Lemma 3, A1 implies CS is locally concave in β.  Using (6), evaluating dCS
SR(β)/dβ at β
C 
and factoring out like terms gives 
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Proof of Proposition 7: 
 
Part (a): Define CS
k(β) as Source’s consumer surplus when Source’s IPR policy is β and 





C) whenever τ∈( (β
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Part (b): When condition (7) holds then, by Proposition 6, β
C>β
O. Since Source’s 

























Proof of Proposition 8: 
 
By the envelope theorem and the local concavity of CS
Sj in β, if β

































































. Because ∆=0 at β























which is positive.  If instead β
k is constrained then marginal changes in N
S leave β
k 
unchanged: dβ
k/dN
S=0. ■ 
 